CJI ANALYSIS • BOMBARDIER
Bombardier: The $10bn debt we don’t owe
From $10bn in distressed debt to an investment-grade balance sheet: How a decade of discipline pulled Bombardier back from the brink of restructuring. Fayaz Hussain reports
“Companies and businesses are making a tremendous amount of money. People are done with their Rolls-Royces and Maybachs, moving on from helicopters to jets.”
CJI ANALYSIS • BOMBARDIER
Bombardier: The $10bn debt we don’t owe
From $10bn in distressed debt to an investment-grade balance sheet: How a decade of discipline pulled Bombardier back from the brink of restructuring. Fayaz Hussain reports
“Companies and businesses are making a tremendous amount of money. People are done with their Rolls-Royces and Maybachs, moving on from helicopters to jets.”
THERE IS a lack of glamour in watching a financial turnaround happen in real time. The story is almost always boring. It is characterised by ruthless discipline, austere capital allocation, aggressive debt-service reduction and solid uninterrupted years of refusing to overleverage the balance sheet. But Bombardier has an impressive story of financial transformation to tell.
“These guys were on the cusp of significant financial difficulty before Éric Martel came in.”
A decade ago, the Canadian aerospace and rail manufacturer knew all about capital misallocation. The company was a sprawling multi-industry conglomerate building rail rolling stock, commercial airliners and business jets. It managed to over-leverage its balance sheet driving its gross debt to $10bn. Credit markets had effectively priced it in distress, equity was wiped out and analysts were looking at the likelihood of restructuring. There were even murmurs of bankruptcy.
A company at the cusp
The year was 2015. Bombardier’s share price had collapsed 95% from its peak. The debt load approached $10bn. Its flagship programme, the C Series airliner, was already being written off by the market.
By the time Éric Martel returned to Bombardier as the chief executive in 2020 after a five-year stint at Hydro Québec, the company he took over was very different to the one he had left. It had already been through a near-death experience.
Konark Gupta, director of Equity Research at Scotiabank, has covered the ticker for two decades now. Speaking to CJI, he recounts the mood back in 2015 and 2016. “These guys were on the cusp of significant financial difficulty before Éric Martel came in,” he tells us. “There was talk about government bailouts, selling of assets ... changing the company structure effectively since that point.”
The catalyst for the first of the many crises that Bombardier faced was the C Series programme. Bombardier had bet big on a clean sheet narrowbody jet to compete with Airbus and Boeing. Gupta remembers the programme struggled to win credibility with investors long before it struggled with customers.
Éric Martel, chief executive, Bombardier
“It was on paper. It was being designed. It was not being manufactured at the same time. And sales were not huge,” he says. “The viability of the programme was mostly questioned by investors at the time ... the budget also got, a lot [bigger]. The timing also started to slip a lot.”
Airbus eventually took control of it, renaming it the A220. The C Series programme was gone before Martel came back in 2020. Fadi Chamoun, MD and equity research analyst at BMO Capital Markets describes a company in the middle of transformation when Martel returned.
“The company was transitioning from a fairly complex conglomerate structure into a pure business aviation company,” he tells us. “When Éric Martel came on board, they were in the process of completing the sale of the last division, the rail division, to Alstom. It was already a deal that was agreed upon before he came on board.”
Chamoun said Martel inherited a business with “a lot of debt” that “was underperforming from a profitability perspective”.
Debt problem to cost problem
Martel brought change. Plans were set in motion to bring the company back from the brink. Gupta said the adjustment in trajectory cannot be pinned to single decision but to a reframing of the entire approach. Martel’s early quarterly earnings call statements focused on the underlying cost structure he had inherited instead of the headline debt figures, he says.
“The $10bn debt they had was the peak. And this debt was not handed over to Éric Martel,” he says. “Some of the debt got shaved off by the asset sales that they were wrapping up when he came in.” But that’s not to say the situation wasn’t dire.
Martel, and the finance team he had assembled, were managing a business that was still burning cash with a fixed cost base for much larger, more diversified company. Their vision was to shrink this down to a pure-play business aviation company. The finance team included Bart Demosky, the chief financial officer (CFO) Gupta calls: “A proven CFO from one of the Canadian companies.” Before joining Bombardier, Demosky was CFO at another company helping to turn the business around. He played the key role in major operational financial turnaround of Canadian Pacific Railway.
Demosky, in conversation with CJI, remembers clearly the mandate he was given at the time of joining Bombardier. “The first priority was establishing credibility through disciplined execution,” he tells us. “We knew that a successful turnaround couldn’t depend on the market gifting us something we hadn’t earned. Instead, we focused on controlling the key levers within our own business, including cost reduction, margin expansion, liquidity and debt reduction, to put the company on a stronger footing.”
Demosky said that this translated to “difficult decisions and maintaining a focus on free cash flow generation rather than pursuing short-term gains”.
Gupta had a similar interpretation of Bombardier’s announcement on its goals. “The goal, the mandate was to improve the margin profile of the company, which is obviously cost focused and then also cutting down debt,” Gupta says. “Once you get the margins up by tackling cost, you know, then you also have to look at how much you’re spending on your capital investments, which they also kind of contained. That created a lot of free cash flow for the firm that ultimately down to pay down the debt.”
Martel and his finance team, led by Demosky, set a public target of delivering $400m in cost savings. They delivered it on schedule. Bombardier also made the decision, before Martel’s return but completed on his watch, to end the production of Learjet. The rationale behind this was that Learjet was the smallest and least competitive (in price terms) aircraft in its lineup.
Gupta says the move was part of a broader capital allocation. “Business jet industry is a smaller industry in terms of number of planes that get sold every year compared with commercial aircraft,” he says. “Getting away from a smaller jet, like Learjet – that was probably not as profitable – helped too.”
“They were in a segment that represented less than 20% of the business jet market and that was not showing really any demand rebound,” Chamoun adds. He credits Martel’s team for “changing Bombardier’s capital allocation framework and focusing on markets where returns were more accretive. The medium and large segment of the market and the aftermarket services segment consumed the capital and that was the right decision for them,” he says.
Fadi Chamoun, MD and equity research analyst at BMO Capital Markets
Turnaround programme
Cost discipline set the base for creating a turnaround. Shedding off low-margin business helped stop any further weakening of financial position. But it was the Global 7500, later renamed Global 8000, that supplied the revenue growth which made the turnaround real.
The timing of the programme’s launch could not have been better, says Chamoun. Martel took over the company just as ultra-long-range jet was entering the early stages of production ramp up. This was to prove the most successful in the company’s history.
“When Éric took over, they were at the initial stages of launching their most successful programme,” Chamoun remembers. “Obviously it was a very successful programme from a sales and market reception perspective. They were able to ramp up the production of that programme, [and it] contributed significant amount of profitability.”
Chamoun says the company’s turnaround outperformed the market. The Global 7500 rollout, the cost reduction programme and the business aviation cycle that became more supportive were key components. “We saw the trajectory of earnings and cash flow consistently improve over the last five years,” he says.
But it took time to convince the industry about the success of the turnaround, says Chamoun. A key turning point was the debt repayment funded by the Alstom in 2021.
In January that year, Bombardier completed the sale of its rail unit to Alstom at an enterprise valuation of about $6.7bn (€5.5bn), using the $3.6bn in net proceeds to clear approximately $2.7bn of its total debt.
“The repayment of debt was a very important step,” he says. “Being able to de-risk the plan was clearly an important moment. But it wasn’t just that– it was all the other things too. They were transparent – we were able to see quarter after quarter that they were making progress on the $400m cost savings, on debt reduction, on the interest cost reduction and they were marching production of the Global 7500 in the right direction.”
Both Chamoun and Gupta agree this progress gained further momentum from the business aviation cycle that turned sharply favourable as the pandemic eased and demand for private travel surged.
That demand led to the resulting order rebound in 2022. This accelerated Bombardier’s turnaround plan bringing in a stronger order intake and advance payments that gave the company momentum. But this did introduce a new supply-chain strain which was not exclusive to Bombardier. “Within the industry, Bombardier seemed to have managed those challenges quite well – especially compared to some of its peers that struggled a bit more,” says Chamoun.
“It was on paper. It was being designed. It was not being manufactured at the same time. And sales were not huge,” he says. “The viability of the programme was mostly questioned by investors at the time ... the budget also got, a lot [bigger]. The timing also started to slip a lot.”
Airbus eventually took control of it, renaming it the A220. The C Series programme was gone before Martel came back in 2020. Fadi Chamoun, MD and equity research analyst at BMO Capital Markets describes a company in the middle of transformation when Martel returned.
“The company was transitioning from a fairly complex conglomerate structure into a pure business aviation company,” he tells us. “When Éric Martel came on board, they were in the process of completing the sale of the last division, the rail division, to Alstom. It was already a deal that was agreed upon before he came on board.”
Chamoun said Martel inherited a business with “a lot of debt” that “was underperforming from a profitability perspective”.
Debt problem to cost problem
Martel brought change. Plans were set in motion to bring the company back from the brink. Gupta said the adjustment in trajectory cannot be pinned to single decision but to a reframing of the entire approach. Martel’s early quarterly earnings call statements focused on the underlying cost structure he had inherited instead of the headline debt figures, he says.
“The $10bn debt they had was the peak. And this debt was not handed over to Éric Martel,” he says. “Some of the debt got shaved off by the asset sales that they were wrapping up when he came in.” But that’s not to say the situation wasn’t dire.
Martel, and the finance team he had assembled, were managing a business that was still burning cash with a fixed cost base for much larger, more diversified company. Their vision was to shrink this down to a pure-play business aviation company. The finance team included Bart Demosky, the chief financial officer (CFO) Gupta calls: “A proven CFO from one of the Canadian companies.” Before joining Bombardier, Demosky was CFO at another company helping to turn the business around. He played the key role in major operational financial turnaround of Canadian Pacific Railway.
Demosky, in conversation with CJI, remembers clearly the mandate he was given at the time of joining Bombardier. “The first priority was establishing credibility through disciplined execution,” he tells us. “We knew that a successful turnaround couldn’t depend on the market gifting us something we hadn’t earned. Instead, we focused on controlling the key levers within our own business, including cost reduction, margin expansion, liquidity and debt reduction, to put the company on a stronger footing.”
Demosky said that this translated to “difficult decisions and maintaining a focus on free cash flow generation rather than pursuing short-term gains”.
Gupta had a similar interpretation of Bombardier’s announcement on its goals. “The goal, the mandate was to improve the margin profile of the company, which is obviously cost focused and then also cutting down debt,” Gupta says. “Once you get the margins up by tackling cost, you know, then you also have to look at how much you’re spending on your capital investments, which they also kind of contained. That created a lot of free cash flow for the firm that ultimately down to pay down the debt.”
Martel and his finance team, led by Demosky, set a public target of delivering $400m in cost savings. They delivered it on schedule. Bombardier also made the decision, before Martel’s return but completed on his watch, to end the production of Learjet. The rationale behind this was that Learjet was the smallest and least competitive (in price terms) aircraft in its lineup.
Gupta says the move was part of a broader capital allocation. “Business jet industry is a smaller industry in terms of number of planes that get sold every year compared with commercial aircraft,” he says. “Getting away from a smaller jet, like Learjet – that was probably not as profitable – helped too.”
“They were in a segment that represented less than 20% of the business jet market and that was not showing really any demand rebound,” Chamoun adds. He credits Martel’s team for “changing Bombardier’s capital allocation framework and focusing on markets where returns were more accretive. The medium and large segment of the market and the aftermarket services segment consumed the capital and that was the right decision for them,” he says.
Fadi Chamoun, MD and equity research analyst at BMO Capital Markets
Turnaround programme
Cost discipline set the base for creating a turnaround. Shedding off low-margin business helped stop any further weakening of financial position. But it was the Global 7500, later renamed Global 8000, that supplied the revenue growth which made the turnaround real.
The timing of the programme’s launch could not have been better, says Chamoun. Martel took over the company just as ultra-long-range jet was entering the early stages of production ramp up. This was to prove the most successful in the company’s history.
“When Éric took over, they were at the initial stages of launching their most successful programme,” Chamoun remembers. “Obviously it was a very successful programme from a sales and market reception perspective. They were able to ramp up the production of that programme, [and it] contributed significant amount of profitability.”
Chamoun says the company’s turnaround outperformed the market. The Global 7500 rollout, the cost reduction programme and the business aviation cycle that became more supportive were key components. “We saw the trajectory of earnings and cash flow consistently improve over the last five years,” he says.
But it took time to convince the industry about the success of the turnaround, says Chamoun. A key turning point was the debt repayment funded by the Alstom in 2021.
In January that year, Bombardier completed the sale of its rail unit to Alstom at an enterprise valuation of about $6.7bn (€5.5bn), using the $3.6bn in net proceeds to clear approximately $2.7bn of its total debt.
“The repayment of debt was a very important step,” he says. “Being able to de-risk the plan was clearly an important moment. But it wasn’t just that– it was all the other things too. They were transparent – we were able to see quarter after quarter that they were making progress on the $400m cost savings, on debt reduction, on the interest cost reduction and they were marching production of the Global 7500 in the right direction.”
Both Chamoun and Gupta agree this progress gained further momentum from the business aviation cycle that turned sharply favourable as the pandemic eased and demand for private travel surged.
That demand led to the resulting order rebound in 2022. This accelerated Bombardier’s turnaround plan bringing in a stronger order intake and advance payments that gave the company momentum. But this did introduce a new supply-chain strain which was not exclusive to Bombardier. “Within the industry, Bombardier seemed to have managed those challenges quite well – especially compared to some of its peers that struggled a bit more,” says Chamoun.
Global 8000 became Bombardier’s primary revenue driver during its corporate turnaround. Central to the aircraft’s appeal is its Global Vision flight deck, which supported the long-range capabilities and operational efficiency that ultimately helped restore the company to profitability.
Services and defence
While the business cycle put wind in the sails of the Global programme, evidence that Bombardier’s turnaround was structural was revealed by how the company’s revenue mix evolved. Aftermarket services – which includes maintenance, parts and support for the roughly 5,500 Bombardier aircraft already flying – has grown from a minor contributor to the topline to now generating 30% of the total revenue.
Demosky says this evolution in revenue mix has changed the company’s risk profile as much as the company’s top and bottom line. “The continued growth of Services is strategically important because it strengthens both our customer relationships and the quality and resilience of our earnings stream,” he says. “Services revenues are typically more recurring and less cyclical than new aircraft deliveries, which makes cash flows more predictable and resilient.”
He links these changes directly to the cost of capital. “Businesses with a larger proportion of recurring, high-margin revenue generally have higher valuations and are viewed as lower risk. Over time, these characteristics can contribute to a lower cost of capital by improving how both debt and equity investors assess Bombardier’s risk profile,” he says.
Gupta says there’s more room for the Services segment to grow. “As your base grows bigger, you sometimes see the growth rates come down over time,” he says. “But I think the growth cannot stop anytime soon. They are producing higher revenue or bigger models, like Challengers and Globals, and those bigger models obviously have more expensive parts, so the more they go into the install base, your mix continues to get better.”
There’s also the growth in company’s new service centres. A new Singapore facility, aimed at the Asia-Pacific market, was announced in June.
Defence has also followed a similar arc, albeit from a much smaller base and shorter timeline. The segment has grown from roughly $250m in revenue to more than $1bn. This was built largely on the special-mission variants of Bombardier’s business jet platforms, converted for military and surveillance customers at the Wichita site that once built Learjets.
“Commercial aircraft sales are typically tied to a delivery event,” Demosky says. “Defence contracts, however, create opportunities to incorporate engineering, missionisation and modification work alongside the aircraft delivery, expanding the value of each transaction beyond the aircraft itself. Defence contracts can also provide greater visibility through structured customer funding and longer-term programme commitments.”
Demosky sees defence as a diversification play for the company “by introducing a revenue stream that is influenced by different market dynamics than traditional business aviation”.
Chamoun, however, is careful not to over pitch the segment. “It’s not a $10bn business, it’s a billion-dollar business,” he says. However, he concedes that the market has recently started paying attention to it. “Defence began to get noticed in the past two years,” he says.
The segment has come under spotlight especially given the accelerating global defence spending and domestic policies that are using procurement as economic stimulus. “The defence business is now looking like a nice small segment that is growing with very strong profitability and probably is less cyclical than business aviation.”
Gupta highlights the margin advantage. “They [Bombardier] have not divulged the margin information per product,” he says, “but directionally at least they have told the market that defence products are higher margin given the nature of customisation that goes on those things.”
Those margins improve the overall health of the company and can complement the services and jet business in times of downward pressure due to cyclical nature of business aviation.
The debt Bombardier no longer owes
Bombardier’s balance sheet migration shows clearest in the credit metrics. Net leverage, which was above 3x adjusted EBITDA only a few years ago, has compressed from 2.9x at year-end 2024 to 1.9x at year-end 2025, and to 1.6x by the second quarter of 2026. The company’s gross debt is also down more than $5.5bn since 2020, including reduction of $1.1bn this year alone. This is already below the company’s 1.5x long-term target.
Demosky says this is due to: “Years of disciplined execution and a relentless focus on our balance sheet priorities.” It is a process that has taken leverage “from turnaround-era levels to below 2x and achieving investment-grade-like credit metrics”.
He adds: “We focused on controlling the key levers within our own business, including cost reduction, margin expansion, liquidity and debt reduction.”
Second-quarter 2026 revenue reached $2.15bn (up 6% year over year) and adjusted EBITDA rose 9% to $325m (translating to margin of 15.1%). The headline figure, however, was the free cash flow of $228m, which was a $392m improvement from same quarter of 2025. Martel, in the earnings call, termed it evidence Bombardier has “moved from managing constraints to creating options”.
Demosky highlighted the refinancing the company did in the second quarter which includes a repayment of debentures due 2026 and senior notes due 2029. This was on top of a $500m issuance “at a rate of five and seven eighths”, which replaced the more expensive high-coupon papers. “We’ve reduced our annual run rate interest expense by a further $80m” with “no debt maturing before November 2030”, he says. More than $2bn of debt still carries coupons above 7%, leaving room to repeat the exercise.
It’s an “inflection point” from a financial viewpoint, as these transactions move the company’s balance-sheet from defensive to offensive, he says. “Today, with net leverage at approximately 1.6x, no debt maturities before 2030 and a much stronger liquidity position, we have significantly greater flexibility than we did a few years ago.”
But this doesn’t mean the business is relaxing its discipline. Rather it’s investing in “aircraft production capacity, Services, Defence and targeted acquisitions, while continuing to optimise our capital structure and evaluating shareholder returns over time”, says Demosky.
The offensive posture surfaced in September, when Bombardier announced plans to acquire MHI Canada Aerospace’s assets in Mississauga, near Toronto. This acquisition adds aerostructure capacity and about 750 employees. Backed by a $21.8bn backlog (up from $17.5bn at year-end 2025), it’s unlikely to be the last such move.
What Bombardier does with its cash next
With leverage largely under control and free cash flow now running at more than $1bn, the analytical conversation has shifted away from survival to allocation. One of the moves that the company made on that front was acquisition of MHICA.
Gupta says that at the current pace of cash generation, Bombardier’s debt would not take many years to retire entirely if the company chose to direct all its free cash flow that way. “The amount of free cash flow they will generate over the next number of years will effectively wipe off the debt,” he says. “I don’t think most companies in manufacturing industries operate on that basis. And it raises the question, could there be some other use of cash at some point?”
Both Chamoun and Gupta expect part of the answer to lie in shareholder returns. But they vary on timings. Bombardier hasn’t declared dividends since 2015. Chamoun expects a combination of both dividends and buybacks. The company already repurchases modest amounts of stock to offset the dilution from employee equity awards.
“I suspect distribution to shareholders will probably be a mix of both dividend and buyback,” he says. “That’s kind of come down to the board. I think they’ll bring that back gradually.”
The timing, however, is uncertain on when this might begin. “I'm not modelling that [dividends] at this point for the next three years,” Gupta says. However, he admits that dividends will be one of the tools that remains available to the board alongside acquisitions and further debt paydown. The deciding factor will be the risk/reward profile of using cash, he believes.
Demosky says the board’s plans are rooted in disciplined capital allocation. “First, we ensure the business has the resources to support profitable growth and high-return investments. Second, we continue optimising the balance sheet where it creates value,” he explains. “As our financial position continues to strengthen and we progress toward our long-term leverage objectives, we will have greater flexibility to evaluate a range of shareholder return opportunities, including dividends and share repurchases.”
Turning to where this cash can be directed from an acquisitions point of view, Chamoun highlights heavy maintenance and landing-gear services. This strategy was demonstrated in the company’s agreement to acquire MHICA, which brings key aerostructures manufacturing and wing assembly operations back in-house to reinforce its supply chain.
However, investments will be strategic. “I don't expect them to become a sub [contractor] and do those types of modifications,” he says. Both Chamoun and Gupta are wary of predicting the launch of a new programme with this cash. Both analysts say the company is more interested in refreshing existing platforms than launching a costly clean-sheet design.
Gupta cites Bombardier’s own public statements. “They have said publicly that they are not going for a clean sheet design model pretty soon. This tells me that they will likely keep the capital investments contained. They will continue with the refreshes and modest upgrades to the existing platforms.” balance sheet migration shows clearest in the credit metrics. Net leverage, which was above 3x adjusted EBITDA only a few years ago, has compressed from 2.9x at year-end 2024 to 1.9x at year-end 2025, and to 1.6x by the second quarter of 2026. The company’s gross debt is also down more than $5.5bn since 2020, including reduction of $1.1bn this year alone. This is already below the company’s 1.5x long-term target.
Demosky says this is due to: “Years of disciplined execution and a relentless focus on our balance sheet priorities.” It is a process that has taken leverage “from turnaround-era levels to below 2x and achieving investment-grade-like credit metrics”.
He adds: “We focused on controlling the key levers within our own business, including cost reduction, margin expansion, liquidity and debt reduction.”
Second-quarter 2026 revenue reached $2.15bn (up 6% year over year) and adjusted EBITDA rose 9% to $325m (translating to margin of 15.1% margin). The headline figure, however, was the free cash flow of $228m, which was a $392m improvement from same quarter of 2025. Martel, in the earnings call, termed it evidence Bombardier has “moved from managing constraints to creating options”.
Demosky highlighted the refinancing the company did in the second quarter which includes a repayment of debentures due 2026 and senior notes due 2029. This was on top of a $500m issuance “at a rate of five and seven eighths”, which replaced the more expensive high-coupon papers. “We’ve reduced our annual run rate interest expense by a further $80m” with “no debt maturing before November 2030”, he says. More than $2bn of debt still carries coupons above 7%, leaving room to repeat the exercise.
It’s an “inflection point” from a financial viewpoint, as these transactions move the company’s balance-sheet from defensive to offensive, he says. “Today, with net leverage at approximately 1.6x, no debt maturities before 2030 and a much stronger liquidity position, we have significantly greater flexibility than we did a few years ago.”
But this doesn’t mean the business is relaxing its discipline. Rather it’s investing in “aircraft production capacity, Services, Defence and targeted acquisitions, while continuing to optimise our capital structure and evaluating shareholder returns over time”, says Demosky.
The offensive posture surfaced in September, when Bombardier announced plans to acquire MHI Canada Aerospace’s assets in Mississauga, near Toronto. This acquisition adds aerostructure capacity and about 750 employees. Backed by a $21.8bn backlog (up from $17.5bn at year-end 2025), it’s unlikely to be the last such move.
The lesson
When asked how he would advise another CFO facing a similar heavily leveraged and complex industrial business, Demosky resists the idea there is a shortcut to a turnaround.
“This was not my first rodeo when it comes to turnarounds and one thing I’ve learned is that experience matters,” he says. “While every situation is different, successful turnarounds tend to share the same fundamentals. You need to understand what truly drives value, make decisions based on facts and maintain the discipline to stay focused on the priorities that will have the greatest impact.”
But he warns against confusing discipline with slow decision making. “Discipline doesn’t mean moving slowly,” he says. “Turnarounds require a sense of urgency. You need to move with a consistent pace, address issues quickly and build momentum early, while still ensuring that decisions are thoughtful and aligned with your long-term objectives.”
The objective behind Bombardier’s cost cutting strategy, he adds, was always cash generation. “You need to create a business that can sustainably generate cash. For us, that meant strengthening operations, diversifying revenues through Services and Defence, improving profitability and maintaining a clear focus on free cash flow generation and debt reduction. Once you establish that foundation, opportunities to create shareholder value start to compound.”
This is what shaped Bombardier’s turnaround. The company had to shrink itself down to a business which it could run well. It spent nearly five years proving to the market, quarter after quarter, refinancing after refinancing, that the debt it once owed was longer a debt it had to carry.
A decade ago, the question was whether Bombardier could survive its debt. Now that debt is disappearing faster than anyone expected. The only question left is what the company that no longer needs saving will choose to do next.
Bombardier’s site in Wichita serves as a key hub for its US operations, supporting flight testing, service and defence work that reinforce the company’s broader operational flexibility and turnaround.
Bart Demosky, chief financial officer, Bombardier
Bombardier’s site in Wichita serves as a key hub for its US operations, supporting flight testing, service and defence work that reinforce the company’s broader operational flexibility and turnaround.
Bart Demosky, chief financial officer, Bombardier
Bombardier’s site in Wichita serves as a key hub for its US operations, supporting flight testing, service and defence work that reinforce the company’s broader operational flexibility and turnaround.
